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1 Introduction
In a world where sensitive data can be published to a worldwide audience with
the press of a button, researchers are increasingly making use of datasets that
were publicized under questionable circumstances. In many cases, such research
would otherwise not be possible. For instance, Weir et al. examined over thirty
million user-generated passwords in order to observe the effects of entropy on
password cracking [10]. All of the passwords in their dataset were obtained from
various private databases that were breached by others and then subsequently
posted to the Internet, the vast majority of which came from the RockYou
breach [9]. Komanduri et al. used this same dataset to examine the effects of
password creation policies on entropy [5]. Research on how users generate pass-
words is important, as passwords are the most common authentication mecha-
nism. The resulting publications help system designers create password policies
that balance both security and usability. Such data is only available as the result
of an independent party’s illegal actions. At the same time, the question exists of
whether benefiting from this data makes a researcher a party to the underlying
release, and whether the resulting research is ethical. This is a difficult question,
especially when similar data could not otherwise be gathered: passwords gen-
erated solely for study lack ecological validity and “real” passwords are usually
unobtainable due to obvious security concerns. Thus, if the researchers are not
personally involved with the illegal acquisition of goods, does their use create an
ethical dilemma?
Similarly, some researchers have gone beyond simply using data that others
have published. In the course of gathering data, many have likely violated various
terms of service—civil contracts. Amitay published an analysis of iPhone unlock
PINs that were collected by his app, which mimics the iPhone unlock screen [1,
3]. He published a summary of this data with the goal of demonstrating that
users choose predictable PINs (e.g., 1234) and hoped that this may prompt them
to choose more secure ones. This resulted in Apple removing the app from the
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app store, alleging a breach of their agreement. Bonneau et al. published a study
on the use of so-called “secret questions” used for backup authentication with
the goal of making these questions harder to compromise [2]. Part of this research
involved compiling lists of common names by crawling Facebook. Others have
performed similar research involving crawling various social networking sites [4,
7, 6]. All of these studies likely violated the sites’ terms of service. This raises
another ethical question about where the line should be drawn: are there fewer
ethical issues involved with gathering data by violating terms of service (i.e.,
civil law) vs. violating criminal laws?
The use of data of questionable provenance in research is not just limited to
passwords. Graphics researchers routinely use a test image featuring a female
model known as “Lenna” [11]. The origin of this image was from a November
1972 issue of Playboy magazine. Despite being copyrighted, this image routinely
appears in journal and conference publications. While Playboy, the copyright
holder, has not taken action against any researchers to date, the ethics and
legality of this practice—despite being widespread—are still questionable. When
an ethical violation has become pervasive, does that lessen its magnitude? Is it
no longer unethical if it becomes a social norm?
These examples illustrate how the desire to disseminate knowledge for the
greater public good may involve actions that are ethically debatable. Indeed, we
are organizing such a debate. Our panel will focus on discussion surrounding the
ethics of using stolen data for research purposes. The panel will be moderated
and will feature panelists representing the following viewpoints:
– Someone who has used stolen data to conduct research.
– Someone who does human subjects research outside the US.
– Someone who sits on an Institutional Review Board (IRB).
– Someone who is morally opposed to using stolen data in research.
WECSR 2012 Panel 3
2 Participants & Positions
2.1 Joseph Bonneau
I advocate that we can adapt ethics of “white-hat hacking” to the use of illicit
data in research. The research community generally accepts papers which identify
vulnerabilities in real software or websites, subject to a few basic principles. I
propose that we work to adapt these into a set of ethics for using illicit data.
First, we should develop a “do no harm” principle which can be realized by only
using illicit data to advance scientific knowledge and not aid any parties in acting
maliciously. In many cases there are technical ways to transform illicit data to
prevent illicit use while still enabling research, such as stripping usernames out
of a leaked password file. Second, we can require responsible disclosure, which is
easy to adopt and often superfluous if companies already know that they have lost
data. Third, external review of proposed studies, for example by an appropriate
institutional ethics board, can help researchers in designing ethical studies. It
is important to develop these principles as studies involving leaked data become
more prominent, but I believe the scientific potential of illicit data sets is too
large to ignore their use.
Joseph is a PhD student at the University of Cambridge. His forthcoming
thesis will focus on the statistics of human chosen secret distributions such as
passwords, PINs, and passphrases. This research has included many real-world
datasets, both leaked and obtained with permission. Joseph’s prior research has
included side-channel cryptography, obfuscation, reverse engineering, and white-
box cryptography. Prior to his PhD, Joseph worked at Cryptography Research,
Inc. He holds MS and BS degrees from Stanford University.
2.2 Sonia Chiasson
I think that as a research community, we need to come up with clear guidelines
and minimum ethical standards for what we will accept for publication in in-
ternational venues. These standards should be upheld regardless of whether the
researchers’ IRBs (in some cases these are non-existent) or local/national laws
are more permissive.
I am not entirely opposed to using publicly available stolen datasets, but the
case must be made for no conceivable harm to the victims. Cases where the
“greater good” is served at the expense of a relatively small number of victims
should not be entertained.
The issue of consent is important here — if we were to conduct a study to
collect this same data rather than using a stolen set, would we need informed
consent from participants? Should we require researchers to put in a reasonable
effort at obtaining consent after the fact (they probably have usernames/email
addresses available), if they want to use stolen data? It may be a daunting task,
but perhaps this is the most ethical way to deal with the issue.
Sonia Chiasson is an assistant professor in the School of Computer Science at
Carleton University in Ottawa, Canada, where she holds the Canada Research
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Chair in Human Oriented Computer Security. Her main research interests focus
on the intersection between human-computer interaction and computer security.
Current projects are on user authentication, usable security for mobile devices,
and computer games for teaching about computer security. She leads the NSERC
ISSNet project on Human Behaviour and Computer Security. Before moving
to Ottawa, she was an instructor in the Department of Computer Science at
the University of Saskatchewan and a member of the HCI Lab. She has been
conducting empirical studies requiring approval from ethics review boards for
over a decade.
2.3 David Dittrich
The Common Rule has many definitions and proscribes what research is or is
not exempt from IRB review. It is unclear how any given IRB would determine
which question is more important: that research is exempt from review because
the stolen data is “public” (45 CFR 46.101(b)(4)), or that there is personally
identifiable information in the stolen dataset that was obtained illegally under
circumstances where those persons identified reasonably believed their data was
not being recorded and would remain private (45 CFR 46.102(f)(2)). I believe
it is more important for researchers to always be able to clearly and coherently
explain their intent in performing research using stolen data, who the researcher
is trying to serve, what measures the researcher is taking to balance benefit to
society vs. risk to those identified in the data, and how those individuals identifi-
able in stolen data will feel about the fact that their stolen data was made public,
how it was studied and what about it was published.
David has over 15 years of experience in computer security operations, com-
puter forensics, network forensics, distributed intruder attack tools (also known
as “botnets”), and the legal and ethical frameworks for responding to computer
attacks. He has co-authored several papers, articles, and book chapters deal-
ing with legal and ethical issues in computer security research and operations.
David has served on the University of Washington’s IRB Committee K for the
past two years, where he provided data security expertise to his Committee and
occasionally to PIs.
2.4 Stuart Schechter
Just as one cannot assume that an act that has not been deemed illegal is so-
cially acceptable, one cannot assume that research that is not forbidden by the
common rule, and allowed by IRBs, would be considered ethical by greater so-
ciety. Alas, the ethical debate over the acceptable use of stolen data often ends
with a declaration that once the data becomes public, the rules of the game make
its use acceptable. Consider, for example, if attackers who had compromised and
released email passwords had also harvested emails and posted them publicly. Re-
searchers might be tempted to use the data to determine if certain traits revealed
in the emails (e.g., erectile dysfunction) were correlated with other, possibly more
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embarrassing, traits (e.g., affinity to the music of Barry Manilow). Even if in-
dividuals who had written the emails being studied were not identified by the
researchers and came to no personal harm, these unwitting research participants
might consider it unethical that their personal information be used by researchers
without their consent. Such a study could not be ethically justified purely on the
willingness of an IRB to approve it. Similarly, it is not sufficient to assume that
lists of compromised passwords are fair game so long as criminals have already
made the lists sufficiently public. They must imagine all reasons why the own-
ers of this passwords might object to the use of these passwords and argue why
they feel justified in going forward despite these objections. Researchers should
not treat compliance with rules as a substitute for sufficient ethical considera-
tion, as doing so may lead to these rules causing more harm to participants than
protection.
Stuart is a man of few accomplishments and so, the reluctant reader should
be pleased to learn, his biography is correspondingly short. Stuart researches
computer security, human behavior, and occasionally missteps in such distant
topics as computer architecture. Those who have worked with Stuart rave about
his “tireless dedication to shooting down any idea that he cannot take credit
for.” Institutions that may or may not be re-evaluating their admissions or hir-
ing policies in response to past associations with Stuart include The Ohio State
University College of Engineering (B.S.), Harvard’s School of Engineering and
Applied Sciences (Ph.D.), MIT Lincoln Laboratory (his former employer), Mi-
crosoft Research (his current employer), and KAIST (to use a Facebookism, “It’s
complicated”).
2.5 Serge Egelman
Serge Egelman, normally type cast as an instigator, will be in the role of mod-
erator. Expect a lively panel.
Serge is a postdoctoral researcher at the University of California, Berkeley.
His research focuses on usable security, with the specific aim of better under-
standing how people make decisions surrounding their privacy and security, and
then creating improved interfaces that better align stated preferences with out-
comes. This has included human subjects research on social networking privacy,
access controls, authentication mechanisms, web browser security warnings, and
privacy-enhancing technologies. He received his PhD from Carnegie Mellon Uni-
versity and prior to that was an undergraduate at the University of Virginia.
He has also performed research at NIST, Brown University, Microsoft Research,
and Xerox PARC.
3 Post-Panel Summaries
3.1 David Dittrich
This panel looked at the question of whether or not it is ethical to use stolen
data, made available on public web sites without the consent of the owners
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of that data or anyone potentially exposed within the data, in research. Just
because it is hard to get access to data, does not mean it is okay to use any
data a researcher can get their hands on. Nor does it mean a researcher can take
short-cuts that may increase risk to individuals who are identifiable in data used
in research (regardless of whether or not those identified are the direct subjects
of research).
Implicit in the question of the ethics of using publicly available stolen data is
a determination of whether such data fits the criteria of “research using publicly
available data sets,” as well as whether such a determination by itself is sufficient
for research to need Institutional Review Board (IRB) review (even expedited
review of minimal risk research). Just because data is found on a web page does
not make it “public.” Researchers have been heard to utter statements like, “I
am using public data, which does not require IRB approval, so there is no need
for me to even talk to my IRB.” Such statements imply the researcher knows
best and that no outside review of their actions are necessary. The argument that
researchers are capable of deciding for themselves what is or is not subject to
external review is belied by stories of failed self-regulation of research in books
like, The Immortal Life of Henrietta Lacks [8]. This book is widely read and
discussed in the IRB community for its telling of the personal story of a family
that suffered multiple medical research abuses in the mid 1900s. Researchers
cannot always be trusted to act appropriately in the face of potentially harmful
research and self-interests, which is part of the reason why IRBs exist today.
Private data that was obtained through illicit means (e.g., data stolen in an
intrusion incident) and put on a public web site is still private data. U.S. Federal
Regulation 45 CFR 46.102(f)(2) defines “identifiable private information” as
including:
“Information about behavior that occurs in a context in which an in-
dividual can reasonably expect that no observation or recording is taking
place, and information which has been provided for specific purposes by
an individual and which the individual can reasonably expect will not be
made public (for example, a medical record). Private information must
be individually identifiable (i.e., the identity of the subject is or may
readily be ascertained by the investigator or associated with the infor-
mation) in order for obtaining the information to constitute research
involving human subjects.”
Therefore, some data made publicly available, such as the Statfor subscriber
database stolen by LulzSec/Anonymous in December, 2011, would fit the defini-
tion of “identifiable private information” and would likely require IRB review of
use in research, regardless of whether that data is available on a free and open
public web site like Pastebin. Data sets, such as the RockYou password file, may
also fit this definition.
To a large extent, IRBs at each institution in the United States function
independently and have some leeway to interpret/apply the elements of the
“Common Rule” as they see fit. Each federally funded research institution in
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the United States operates under something known as their Federal Wide As-
surance (FWA). The FWA is the institution’s commitment to the Department
of Health and Human Services (HHS) that it will comply with HHS rules for
human subjects protection under 45 CFR 46. Some institutions may choose to
require IRB review for all research at the institution, regardless of the funding
source, while others may only require that federally funded research go before
an IRB. The IRB committee is there to evaluate the risk to subjects from the
research subjects’ perspectives, in a way acting as their representative.
Those who own the data, and those who are identified within the data, may
have an expectation of privacy in that data. When stolen data is made public,
and a private individual decides to archive that data, they are likely operating
outside the purview of an IRB and may be taking no consideration of the risks to
identifiable individuals that an IRB would. The researcher wanting to use that
data may, however, be operating within the IRB’s purview and must conform
with institutional requirements for IRB review of proposed research. A situation
in which researchers bypass IRB review by asserting the “public data” exclusion
may create an environment where individuals purposefully steal data in order to
make it available to researchers, which violates both the spirit and letter of the
law regarding human subjects protection via IRBs.
The identifiability of individuals within the data may be of greater impor-
tance in evaluating whether an IRB committee must approve research using
public data than simply answering the question, “is the data available to any-
one on the internet?” There may be instances when publicly available data may
be partially de-identified, but can be combined by a researcher with other data
sources, re-identifying individuals within the data. The act of re-identifying in-
dividuals and exposing them publicly can be harmful to those individuals. For
this reason, many bio-repositories that make de-identified data available to re-
searchers without necessitating IRB review, in order to safeguard the identifia-
bility of subjects, will require the researcher to sign an agreement that includes
a clause that prevents the researcher from taking steps to re-identify the individ-
uals whose bio-samples are being studied. While it may show cleverness on the
part of a researcher to identify an individual from de-identified or anonymized
data, a researcher could be sanctioned by their IRB for doing so.
The University of Washington’s Human Subjects Division publishes guid-
ance/policy on use of public data sets.1 UW’s policy defines public data sets as
being, “data files prepared by investigators or data suppliers with the intent of
making them available for public use” and discusses usage restrictions, access
agreements for restricted datasets, and data protection mechanisms that must be
applied to ensure no unauthorized disclosure of individuals who are identifiable
within data sets. They also define what “publicly available” and “de-identified”
mean. A list of over two dozen data sets that have been evaluated by the UW
IRB office are on a list of approved data sets that require no IRB review. Re-
searchers who want to use other data sets that are not on the pre-approved list
can nominate the data set for evaluation. If a funding agency does not require
1 http://www.washington.edu/research/hsd/docs/1125
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IRB review for publicly available data, researchers can provide documentation
to that effect and the IRB will make a determination about whether any IRB
review is required. For all other data, the IRB evaluates the proposed use of the
data.
It is not a researcher’s right to decide whether their research is exempt from
IRB review, or whether data they wish to use does or does not conform with the
definition of “public data” under the Common Rule. The researcher is obligated
to confirm their interpretation with the IRB, who is the arbiter of how the
Common Rule is interpreted as specified in their FWA. The researcher may risk
sanction if they bypass or ignore the IRB’s determination, which can vary by
institution and by IRB. OHRP is relatively silent on the parameters of non-
compliance. If an IRB determines a researcher acted unethically, or failed to
submit research or data use to review when it should have been evaluated, the
IRB may have the authority to do any/all of the following: (1) Halt current
research and/or any further research; (2) Ask for publication of results to be
halted, withdrawn, or modified to note researcher non-compliance; (3) Cite the
researcher for serious non-compliance; (4) Require that all future research by
that researcher be reviewed.
In other words, when it comes to performing research using stolen data, the
catch phrase should be “researcher beware.”
3.2 Stuart Schecter
Stuart argued that exemption four in the Common Rule, which states that all
research using publicly available sources need not be reviewed by IRBs, gives
researchers the freedom to perform studies that a great majority of the public
might consider objectionable and unethical. He cautioned that researchers should
not “turn off their ethics caps” and assume a study will be considered ethical
simply because it qualifies for exemption from IRB reviews. To support this
position, he provided three examples of research that qualifies for exemption
four, but for which the social costs may outweigh the benefits.
In the first example, he explained example passwords from a compromised
password data set may be traceable back to the accountholder even if no other
information about the accountholder is present. It may be a password that con-
tains data about the accountholder or even a password that appears random,
but that contains a string that others may associate with that accountholder.
For example, part of the password may be a password that the user shares with
a significant other.
In the second example, Stuart described the implications if researchers were
to come across a publicly-available repository of thousands of stolen medical
records. He described how researchers might use these records to create a ma-
chine learning algorithm that could predict the likelihood that a patient suffered
from a degenerative mental illness that would cause increasingly erratic behavior.
The consequences of such research is those patients who this algorithm indicates
are likely to be suffering from this illness—but were not yet diagnosed—would
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have their potential condition revealed to anyone who cared to run the algo-
rithm on the data set. Stuart provided an example of a hypothetical individual,
diagnosed with this degenerative mental illness, having to live the remainder of
his life with every friend and colleague concerned that his every behavior might
be the result of a mental condition predicted by this algorithm.
In the third hypothetical example, Stuart described how researchers might
abuse a publicly-available repository of stolen health records from minority
groups (e.g., racial minorities or LGBT). He described how researchers at religiously-
affiliated anti-homosexual universities might use the data to argue that homo-
sexual youth were more likely to engage in a socially undesirable behavior (e.g.,
smoking) or how other researchers might use data on racial minorities to asso-
ciate them with genetically undesirable traits.
Stuart argued that in many of these cases, the general public would find
such research objectionable and question any system of ethical regulation that
exempted it from review.
In these cases, Stuart proposed that the standard of ethical behavior should
rely on whether researchers could reasonably anticipate that the great majority
of those whose data had been stolen would consent to the research taking place,
and that the social benefits outweigh the social costs. Stuart’s position is thus
that public data should only be exempt from ethics reviews if the data were
made public with the consent of its subjects.
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